WEILL V; THOMPSON and others, Intervenors.1
(Oircuit Oourt, E. D. Loui8iana. January 20, 1885.)
IMXOVABI,ES BY Ur:STINATION-MoRTGAGE.
Machinery attached to a plantation, and used for plantation purposes, though included in a mortgage, if purchased and removed, even during the pendency of a suit to enforce the mortgage, were withdrawn from the operation of the mortgage. When machinery is removed from a plantation, it again becomes a movable, and as such could not be susceptible of mortgage, even if the purchaser was in bad faith; that is, purchased with knowledge of the mortgage. Odizens' Bank v. Knapp, 22 La. Ann. 117.
, At Law. Un trIal ot mterventions. C. B. Singleton, R. H. Browne, and B. F. Choate, for plaintiff. Joseph P. Hornor and Francis W. Ba.ker, for intervenors. BILLINGS, J. The question submitted is upon the intervention. Defendant executed a mortgage to plaintiff of a plantation. At the time of the execution of the mortgage, the mules and machinery in question were upon the plantation, and in use in connection with it for the purpose of working it. Subsequently, and with knowledge of the mortgagee, the intervenors purchased these articles; they were severed from the plantation, and were in the possession of intervenors when the proceedings to foreclose the mortgage were instituted. That machinery so situated were by destination immovables, is determined by Civil Code La. art. 468. The case of Citizens' Bank v. Knapp, 22 La. Ann. 117, holds that machinery attached to a plantation and used for plantation purposes, though included in a mortgage, if purchased and removed, even during the pendency of a suit to enforce the mortgage, were withdrawn from the operation of the mortgage. The ground upon which the conclusion of the court is placed, is that, when detached from the sugar-house and removed from the plantation, the machinery became again amovable, and as such could not be susceptible of mortgage; that this would be true even if the purchaser was in bad faith; that is, purchased with knowledge of the mortgage. A strong argument, both at the trial and subsequently by brief, was made in favor of the destination which the law had given to the mules and machinery, continuing so long as the persons dealing with the property knew of the mortgage. But in cases not involving 3,ny provision of the constitution of the United and not springing out of negotiable paper; (which last are ranked among causes governedby the general law-merchant and not by the local law,) the can· struction given by the court of last resort ofa state, and not qualified by any subsequent decision, as to the meaning of a statute, is a part. of the statute, and is binding upon the federal courts.
lR(;portcd by Joseph P. Hornor, Esq., of the New Orleans bar.
HARTINGER V. FEIUUNG.
In Leffingwell v. Warren, 2 Black, 603, the supreme court says: "The construction given to a statute of a state by the highest judicial tribunal of such state is regarded as a part of the statute,and is as binding, upon the courts of the United States as the text." There is no ambiguity in the opinion of the supreme court,
Bank v. Knapp,) nor has it been at all qualified by any subsequent de-
<lision of that tribunal. The question submitted is not one of those where the federal courts may act independently of the judicial construction of the highest tribunal of a state. The reported case is even stronger than this, for the severance of the property from the plantation was effected even after the institution of the suit to foreclose. The knowledge there was certainly as clear as here. This case is, therefore, paramount with this court, and leaves no latitude, except to ascertain carefully what the views of the court, as expressed, are. These close the case against the plaintiff and require a judgment in favor of the intervenors, with tl. reservation to the plaintiff to sue for all damages if the property mortgaged shall not or has not realized a sufficient amount to pay the mortgage. Let there be judgment accordingly.
and. others v.
(Circuit Court, N. D. Iowa, E. D.
PAIlENT AND CHTLD-INHERITANCE BY IU,EGITIMATE CHILD-PROOF OF PATERNITY AND RECOGNITION-CODE lowA,§ 2466. ,
To enable an iIlegitimatechild to inherit, uiJder section 2466 of the Iowa Code, it must appear that the' recognition or proof of paternity relied upon, occurred after the passage:of the act by the legislature.
At Law. Demurrer to petition filed by Justina Kahl, intervenor. Longneville et Lenehan, for plaintiffs Utt Bros., for intervenor. SHIRAS, J. In January, 1881, one Joseph Koetzl died intestate at Dubuque, Iowa. The defendant Peter Fen"ing was appointed administrator of the estate by the circuit court of Dubuque county. After the payment of all claims against the estate, there was left in the hands of the administrator the sum of $3,765, which he was ordered by the circuit court to pay over to the heirs of the decedent. The plaintiffs herein brought this action against the administrator, for the purpose of establishing their right to the fund as next of kin and heil's at law of J 0seph Koetzl. The intervenor, Justina Kahl, with leave of the court, filed a petition of intervention, wherein she asserts that she is the illegitimate daughter of Koetzl; that she was born in the kingdom of Bavaria on the eleventh of April, 1834, and has
llleported by Robertson Howard, Esq., of the St. Paul bar.