ONE HUNDRED AND NINE'.rt-SlX MARES.
UNITED STATES V. ONE HUNDRED AND
(Oi'T'cuit OOU'T't, W.
CuSTOMS DUTIES-MARES FOR BREEDING PURPOSES-J:r,,""TENTION OF IMPORTER.
The statute of the United States providing that" animals specially imported for breeding purposes shall be admitted free, upon proof satisfactory to the secretary of the treasury, and under such regulations as he may prescribe, n limits free importation of animals to such as are imported for the particular purpose of breeding; and it is a sufficient compliance with the statute that the importer, in good faith, intends them for that purpose, and it does not prevent his otherwise disposing of them if he afterwards finds it necessary or. desirable to do so.
of Information for the condemnation and sale of property for non-payment .of customs duties. The opinion states the case. Did. A.tty. Kleiberg, for the United States. A. J. Evans, for claimant. TURNER, J. In the month of April, 1886, the claimant in this cause went to the republic of Mexico, and made arrangements to export into the United States mares, horses, and mules. He made application to import same, and claimed that the mares were desired for breeding purposes. He procured his necessary papers, imported the animals, and, after some little time, information was conveyed to the custom officers that the said mares were really intended to be placed upon the market, and sold whenever' a proper opportunity presented itself. Whereupon, by direction of the custom officers, the mares were seized as. forfeited to the United States because of the fraud practiced upon the customs by the claimant in pretending that he desired to im port same for breeding purposes when in fact they were imported for the purpose of sale and profit. The d\strict attorney filed his libel of information with a view of having the said mares duly condemned, and sold as forfeited to the government for non-payment of duties. Mr. Rust, the import'er, filed his claim to the property, denying the fraud. The mares, after seizure, were sold by the order of the court, and the proceeds are now in the hands of the register of the court awaiting judicial action. The question raised, among others, is, what is the true interpretation of the statnte upon the subject? It reads as follows:
co Anhnals specially imported for breeding purposes, shall be admitted free upon proof thereof satisfactory to the secretary of the treasury, and under such regulations as he may prescribe." ' .
. It is contended by counsel that all animalsoftbe sheep, horse, or bovine species, capable of procreation, are to be admitted free of duty unde:t; this law, and counsel for the governmep.t insists that they ar& only admitted free of duty when desired by the importer for breeding purposes.
It becomes my duty to construe this statute. It is a rule of universal application that, in construing statutes, effect shall be given to 'every word contained therein, if that can be done, The words "for breeding purposes," in the st!l.t'ute, must be held to be a limitation upon the right to introduce animals duty free, and is equivalent to declaring that that is the use to which the animals are to be put in order to be admitted under this statute. The law provides that satisfactory proof shall be made, as may be required by the secretary, How can a man who imports animals for sale in the market state or swear that they are wanted for breeding purposes? In the nature of thing!! he could do neither, and yet the law, and the rules prescribed by the secretary, require it. I recognize the force of the argument of counsel for the claimant, based upon the proposition that long acquiescence in the construction of a statute is pursuasiveof its correctness. The rule, however, applies more strictly to judicial interpretation than 'upon those which may be called quasi judicial, a's in this case; and the rulings of the different secretaries upon the question involved in this case show the wisdom of the provision in the llj,w that, in cases of this character, the interpretation of the secretary shall not be the rule of action whenever a judicial interpretation shall be finally made giving a different interpretation. A judicial determination of the proper construction of the statute now brought in question has not, as I am aware, ever been had. The rule contended for by counsel for claimant-viz., when there is an ambiguity in the statute, (and especially one in its nature quasi criminal,) it should be construed most favorably to the citizen-is recognized. The question, then, is, is there an ambiguity in this statute? It reads as in the words above stated? It will be noticed that in punctuating this clause but two punctuation marks are used, each a comma, one after the word "purposes," and one after the words "secretary of the treasury." Counsel for claimant insists that the word "specially" qualifies the wo,d "imported," and counsel for the government insists that itapplies to and qualifies the words "for breeding purposes." What other word may be used instead of "specially," and perform the same office? The dictionary referred to defines "specially" as "particular," Can it be said that, when an importation is made, that the secretary of the treasury would require proof that it was a particular importation? I think not, as every impOl'tation is, as to that importation, apartic'ular importation. On the other, hand, if we apply the word as is claimed by counsel for the government, it would be consistent to say that the secretary should and could require proof of the fact that the animals were imported for the particular purpose of breedTo my mind the above construction does away with any just charge or claim that there is in fact an ambiguity, either latent or patent, in the statute under consideration.
UNITED STATES V. OKE HUNDRED AND NINETY-SIX MARES.
It is not claimed by the counsel fo1.' the claimant that the rulings of the secretary are of absolute binding force, but that they are persuasive. The case cited, where the secretary interpolated words into the statute, and then made his rulings thereon, was reversed by the supreme court, and most properly so. The question presented here, however, is upon the very words of the statute as found in the statutes themselves, and it devolves upon the court to construe those words. If I had access to the debates in congress upon this subject, and could ascertain therefrom that the measure was one of public policy, then I would be prepared to givEl the most liberal construction to the words used, with a view to that end. On the other hand, if trhose debates showed the purpose was to confer a privilege to the individual man, I should be prepared to as used. If the place a less liberal interpretation upon· the object was to ad.mit free of duty all females of the horse, sheep, and bovine. species capable of propagating their species, we would conclude that they naturally would have said>so, and would not have said "for the pll,rticular or special purpose of breeding," and would not have required proof to satisfy the secretary that they were forthe particular purpose of breeding. Nor does this interpretation embrace the purposes could never sell idea that a party impm;,ting for and dispose of such animals, but does imply that the intent and pur,: ppse of the importer was, at and before the importation, to use them for the purpose of breeding. I can well imagine how a man who in good faith imported animals for breeding could, under a change of circumstances, be justified in making sale of property thus situated. Suppose some unforeseen accident, misfortune, or other calamity overtook or beset him, or change in circumstances rendered it incompat;. ible with his intention to devote them to breeding purposes, it could not be insisted that this changed condition of affairs could relate back to and affect the bOna fides of his intention at the time he made the importation. No court would sanction such an unjust interpretation of the law. For the reasons above given, which are more for the counsel than for the jury, I am constrained to put the case to the jury upon the question of bona fide intention on the part of the claimant at and before he malie the importation.
FEDERAL REPORTER, BUTLER and others v. BAINBRIDGE and others.·
(Oircuit Oourt, S.
n. NetD York.
November 16, 1886.)
PATENTS FORlNVENTIONS-JOINT INVENTOJlS·
. The defense that two persons to whom a patent has issued as joint inventOrS were not. in fact, joint inventors, is so purely formal that it cannot be ,regarded with favor, unless, it be shown that the action of the patentees i1;1 thll.t reg31'd was disingenuoQs, or calculated to mislead the defendants. 'Where the defense or wl1nt of joint invention in the patentees was not pleaded,'nor fairly raised by the answer, but proofs to support it were taken, ,and the point made at the hearing, held.. there was grave doubt whether the defensll ('ould be considered.
PROOF OF WANT OF. OF WANT OF JOINT INVENTION-PLEADING.
Where devices which were definitel, proved to have been before did not anticipate thll.invention, and,those which would anticipate were not definitely 'proved to have been before, held, that the evidence was too vague, uncertain, and indefinite to satisfy the mind of the court beyond a reasonable doubt, and to overcome the presumption of novelty arising from the patent itself. 4. BAM'$-INVENTION-PRESENCE OF, now DETERMINED· .In a pl1tent case, the question of invention must depend upon the facts and cireumstances of the case,'and the perplexities which surround such controversie!l:cannot always be'solved by an examination of adjudged cases. They to the paths to be tra!e,rsed..but he who desires to select the rlghtone must depend largely upon his own Judgment. IS. BAME"'-EMBOSSED CARDS. A claim for" a circular or card two or more folds, upon one or more of which embossed or pressed out araised panel or panels. to represent cards, upon'which the printing is afterwards done, substantially as and tor the 'purpos'eset forth." sustained. although the art of embossing was old at the of the invention, and cards having smaller printed cards pasted upon them,anq papers struck up, with various figures, emblems, and devices, including sinall rectangular panels, were well known pilor to that date. 8. SAME.. , . ' Although the invention may be a simple one, and it is hard to understand why' the' idea did not occur to some one long before; still if the fact remains that it ,never did, although something of the kind was long wanted, these circuwatances warrant the,conclusion that there was invention in producing it. 'I. SAME-CHARACTERISTICS OF INVENTION-l'IIECHANICAL SKILL. , "It is the presence of a thought like this 'which raises an'ordinarymechanic to the plane of an inventor. Invention requires thought; mechanical skill does not. The' ane is the result of mental, the other of manual action."
In E.quHy. Bill for infringement. James A. Whitney and L. E. Gilbert,forcQmplainants. Edwin H. Brown, for defendants. ' COXE, J. This is an action in equity, based upon letters patent No. 273,023, granted to Orlando W. Butler and Thomas W. Kelley, February 27, 1883, for an improvement in paper for cards and circulars. The purpose of the invention was to supersede the expensive and cumbersome method of pasting separate cards upon wedding invitations and similar papers, by substituting therefor a card having
1 Edited by
Charles C. Linthicum, Esq.. of the Chicago bar.