count of insulting language used by him concerning his father in connemion with the .case, the beating having no relation to the character of C, as awitness, he is not guilty of a violation of section 5399.
Information for Intimidating a Witness. C. M. Furman, Asst. Dist. AU]. J. K. Henry, for defendants. J., (charging fury.) You are trying an information against John Kee for violating section 5399, Rev. St.,-that is to say, for threatening, intimidating, impeding, and influencing one Ben Corder, a witness in a cause before a commissioner of this court. In reaching your conclusion you must be satisfied by the evidence that the defendant did threaten and beat Ben Corder in the manner stated by the witnesses for the government. N ext, that defendant knew or had reason to know that Corder was a witness for the United States in the case before the commissioner. Then, that he did threaten and beat him because he was such witness, and for the purpose ofintimidating, impeding, or influencing him in giving his testimony. The defense is that Corder had stated that the father of defendant, a very old man, who had professed during his whole life to be a" teetotaler," and of late years a prohibitionist, had secretly purchased whisky from a negro; that defendant had warned Corder if he ever repeated what he styled the "malicious falsehood," he would punish him; that his father had been summoned before the commissioner to testify to the fact of the sale in a case brought against the negro, and had been so summoned upon the information of Corder, given after the warning, defendant not knowing that Corder was himself a witness. If you are satisfied that the threats and consequent beating were uttered and inflicted because of this insulting charge against the old man, having no relation to the character of Corder as a witness, without knowledge that he was a witness, and induced entirely by the repetition of the insult, you may find the defendant not guilty. If the threats and violence were intended to prevent Corder from testifying, you may find defendant guilty.
(Dist1'ict Oourt, D. South Oarolina.
INTERNAL REVENUE-SALE OF SPIRITUOUS LIQUORS BY ApOTIIECARY.
An apothecary, who bona fide uses spirituous liquors in the preparation of a medicine, to be used as such, and not as a beverage, does not violate Rev. St. U, S. § 3242, by not paying the special tax required of a retail liquor dealer.
Indictment for Selling Liquor without Payment of Special Tax. Abiel Lathrop, Dist. Atty. A. H. Dean, for defendant.
TRA VERB V. BUCKLEY.
SIMONTON, J., (charging jury.) The defendant, an apothecary, is charged with violating section 3242, Rev. St., being a retail liquor dealer without paying the special tax. It is not denied that he sold to the several persons, witnesses for the government, a compound of rye whisky and calisaya bark. The defense is that this was a medicine originally put up under a prescription of a physician. An apothecary who bona fide uses spirituous liquor exclusively in the preparation or making up of medicines need not pay the special tax. These are the questions you must answer in this case: In the sale made by defendant to the witnesses for the government, did he bona fide sell them the compound as medicine, and not as a beverage, or was the compound simply whisky in disguise? Is it a medicine to cure disease, or is it intended to gratify the thirst for drink? If it is a medicine, has it intoxicating quality? If so, was this known to defendant? Did he sell it knowing or having reason to know that it was purchased to be used as a beverage? If it was fide as a medicine, to be used as a medicine, defendant is not sold guilty.
August 19. 1889.)
(Oircuit Oourt, D. Massacltusetls.
PATENTS FOR INVENTIONS-PRIOR CONDITION OF ART.
In view of the prior use of detachable blocks notched at tbe end and under the edge for spreading hammocks. there is no invention in tbe second claim of letters patent granted to Travers November 18,1879, in "the novel use of detachable notched distending blocks" in improved hammocks.
Bill to enjoin infringement of patent.
Briesen, Steele & Knauth, for complainant. Browne & BTOwne, for defendants.
COLT, J. This case now comes before the court on final hearing. Since the hearing upon motion for an injunction (35 Fed. Rep. 133) the defendants have strengthened their position as to the prior condition of the art. The evidence now before me proves, I think, the prior use, for spreading a hammock, of a detachable straight block :n.otched at both ends, a detachable straight block notched at both ends and on the under edge, a curved block, in the form of a barrel stave, notched at both ends, and a curved block having properly spaced holes in it through which the lanyards passed. The Travers patent was for an improved hammock, and the invention consisted of several distinct improvements, among which, as the specification states, "is the novel use of detachable, notched distending blocks." It may be that in the patent, considered as a whole, there was invention. The only point in controversy' here is whether there was invention in the use of the detachable hlock which is made the subject of the second claim, and I am satisfied, in view of what the prior