gave him a sample, and afterwards sent him a photograpn of seersucker to work by, is not disputed. Probably he showed Gilmore, and perhaps gave to him, a sketch showing his idea of how the seersucker could be imitated by shading off cross lines between the stripes. Whatever he may have done with such a sketch, he had nothing to do about designing or engraving the tools for printing the imitation, but through Gilmore; and that the designer and engraver were con· trolled by anything but the sample and photograph given to them bY' Gilmore is not made to appear. They seem to have produced this imitation of seersucker from this sample and photograph, at the plaintiff's request. through Gilmore, without further direction from the plaintiff. That he got the idea of his pattern from seersucker would not prevent a patent for his pattern; but he could not patent the idea of imitating eeersucker as a design, as was clearly shown by Judge Shipman, nor the shading of cross lines in an imitation of it, nor by a design. patent his method of imitating it. He does not really appear now, more 'than before to have invented anything patentable that would be patented in his patent. Besides this, the defendants' pattern is .n<>t more like the plaintiff's than like the photograph of sea-sucker, which all would have a right to work into any pattern nOI & copy of a patented one. Let a decree be entered dismissing the bilL
THE ALICE J. VENABLlIL
THE SAMUEL T. WHITB. HASTINGS v. THE ELEXEN£
GIBBONS v. THE ALICE J. VENABL1L
SAME v. THE SAMUEL T. WHITE.
(DIstrict Conrt, E. D. VirgInIa. November 80, 1892.'
CoNSTITUTIONAL LAw-MARITDIlll LmNs-BTATB OYSTER LAws-ColUI804TION OJ' VESSEL BY STATE.
Oode Va. § 2186, providing that a sale of a veBBel forfeited by proceedIngs In the state court for violating the oyster laws of the state "shall vest In the pnrchaser a clell.r and absolute title," is null and Inoperative, In so far as It would divest the maritime liens of innocent parties attaching b&fore the arrest of the vessel; and such vessel may be subsequently seized In tlle hands of the purchaser, and subjected to such liens, by proceedings In the federal admiralty courts. Taylor v. Carryl, 20 How. 583, dist1Jlr. guished. On such a libel, claims for supplies, materials, and repairs furnished wifhin six months before the seizure of the vessel by the state must be allowed, but materials furnished after such seizure mWlt be disallowed, ali not within the jurisdiction of the court. Claims for wages by seamen who were on the vessel at the time of ber lIeizure, and presumably participating In the violation of law for which IIbe was seized, must be dil!allowell.
SAME-MARITIME LIENs-SUPPLIES AND MATBRIALII.
1J1. Admiralty. Libels tor materials, repairs, and seo.rnan's wape.
S. Hodson, ·forUbelants. , i"llt.'J'ltylorScott, Atty. Qen., for the State of Virginia. ,,;E[amnanson & Heath and Robert L. MontaguelJr., for claimants. f$GHES. District Judge. These vessels; 'arrested, condemned. aad forfeiture· proceedings instituted by the state of VirginiafOlWviolations of laws enacted for the protection of oyster beds belOlDgiligto the state, have been libeled in this' court for claims of material men and seamen, which constituted liens in admiralty upon the several vessels before their seizure by officers of the state. Bomeof these claims' will be allowed by this court, some of them disu.llowM; but the question in the rase of each will remain, whether penal and forfeiture proceedings' prosecuted by the sta:te to a sale of a vessel ,arrested in delictO dtvests a lien in admiralty previously resting upon ,that vessel. Inasmuch as it is expressly enacted by section 2186 of the CQde of Virginia that such sale vest in the purchaser a clear and absolute title to the property sold," the question already additional form whether that clause of the section is operative; or null and void, as to previously subsisting admiralty liens. 'These libels were not filed in either case during the pendency of thei1fodeiture proceedings prosecuted by the state. They were each of them brought after the final confiscation of the vessels, and after their coming into the hands 01 the purchasers. There was no actual conflict of jurisdiction between the court in which the criminal proceedings were had and the admiralty court. It was not until the confiscation of the vessels, 'Will'! tinally consummated that suit in admiralty was instituted here to enforce the respective maritime liens; so that another form of:the question which has been stated is whether an admiralty lien can 'be/divested under proceedings, even criminal in character, by it cOIlllIl,?n-Iaw court. The proviRions of the Code authorizing the arrest and confiscation of vessels for violations 'tif, oyster laws are such as intentionally exclude all of the, ;vessels sold. The posting of a notice of the information filed for the forfeiture of the offending vessel on the front door of the courthouse at which the proceeding is conducted" aud its publication in a newspaper of the state, such posting and publication, it is enacted, "shall be sufficient service of the notice on ltllpersons concerned in interest." It is further enacted that "ignorance of the respondent, or other contestant that the property seized was being used in violation of law shall be n.o defense. Nor shall it be ground of defense that the person by whom the said property was used in violating the law has not been convicted of such violation." The saJe of a ship by an admiralty court for the satisfaction of maritimeliep.s, in due coUrse of a suit in admiralty, gives the title to the purchaser against all the world. It gives such title by virtue of the maritime law, which is part of the law of nations. The provisions of the (jode of Virginia as to the trial, the notice of trial, and the saIeof'a: vesRel arrested for violations oftha oyster laws are intended, without the sanction of the maritime law, or of the law of nations, wmakethe sale of a vessel under the proceeding of the local court as
conclusive against the world as a sale in admiraltyi so that the question already stated assumes the additional form whether the rights of maritime creditors in a ship can be divested by a local court by a proceeding unknown to the maritime law. Let it be premised that it is declared by the constitution of the United States that "congress shall have power to constitute tribunals inferior to the supreme COurti" that "the judicial power of the United States shall be vested in one. supreme court, and in such inferior courts as congress may from time to time ordain and establish i,l that "the judicial power shall extend to all cases of admiralty and mario time jurisdiction;" that "no state shall pass any law impairing the obligation of contractsi" and that "no person shall be deprived of property without due process of law." Let it be also premised that congress, in exercising its powers derived from the constitution, has provided that the district courts of the United States shall be conrts of admiralty. and has, by the ninth section of the judiciary act of 1789, enacted that these courts "shall have exclusive origin""l cognizance of all civil causes of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction." The precedent principally relied upon by the respondents to the libels pending in this court is that of Taylor v. Carryl, 20 How. 583. In that case a creditor at large of the owners of the. barque Royal Saxon, of LondondeI'lJT, Ireland, then lying in the port of Philadelphia, whose claim was not maritime, sued out a foreign attachment at Philadelphia, under which the ship was arrested and held to answer the judgment of the court of common law from which the attachment issued. While this suit was pending, the seamen on board the ship filed a libel for their wages in the admiralty court, sitting at Philadelphia, pror,ess under which was duly served by its marshal. While the suit at common law was still pending, the admiralty court pro· nounced a decree in favor of the libelants. Under this decree execution was issued, and the ship sold by the marshal, and delivered to the purchaser. Thereupon the plaintiffs in the common-law suit replevied the ship in the suit instituted in the common-law court. Under order of this court the sheriff sold the ship. These proceedings, thus briefly described, went to the supreme court of the United States for review, and that court held that in order to give jurisdiction to the admiralty court the arrest under its process must have been valid; and this was not the case when the vE>..8sel was, at the time of the seizure, in the actual and legal possession of the sheriff. This case is far from being all fours with the one at bar, and decided nothing more than that a ship held in custody pending a litigation by one court is not liable to process of arrest by another court, even although the latter be a court of admiralty. This case of Taylor v. Carryl is, however, full of instruction for us in the one we have now under consideration. The supreme court was divided on the question of the competency of the admiralty court at Philadelphia to deal with the Royal Saxon while in custody of a common-law court. The majority held that it was not. The justices who dissented from this view were the admiralty judges, Taney, of Baltimore, Grier, of Philadelphia, Wayne, of Savannah, and Clifford, of Belfast,· Me. As the dissenting opinion of Chief Justice Taney is a luminous
beaconbri.Milerican jui'isprudenee, I will extract 'ftooly from it. He
of law which have beell so long and so well esthat it is sufficient to stAte them without referring to authorities. The lien of seamen for their' wages is prior and paramount to all other claims on the vessel. and illnstbefirst paid. "By the ooustitutloll and 'laws of the Illlited States the unly court that hal) jurisdiction over ,tJiis lien, or ill authorized to enforce it, is the admiralty court, and it is the duty of that court to do so.. The seamen, as a matter of right, are entitled tci the process of the court to enforce payment promptly, in order that they may not be left penniless and without the, means of support on shore, and the light to this remedy ieas, well and firmly. ,elltablished as the light to the Paramount lien. No court of common law cali enforce or displace tnis lien. It has no' juri$diction over it, }lor illlY right tobbstrnct or interfere with tile lien or the remedY which is given to the soo.ml!n. "A geueraloreditor of the shipowner has no lielt on the vessel. When she is attached by process a court of common law,: npthing is taken, or can be but, mterest o;(,the owner remaining after the maritime liens are The t,eizure does not reach them. The thing taken is not the iriterest 'tp:the arid the only interest which this process can seize is a secondary and subordinate interest, subject to; the superior and paraclaiPls of wages; ,8.l!d whatwilJ, be:the amount of those clablls,; pI! -whether auything ,would remain to be, attacmed, the court of common lawcanD:0t knowunID tll('yare heard and decided upon in the court of admiralty. f these propositions to be disputed. ,",'Un!ler 'itIHLattachment, therefore, whibh isSued from the common-lawcourt Qf Was legally in the of the sheriff but the interestotthe owner, whatever ,It mig'ht prove to be·. .u:ter the Ileus were heard and ad,jwUqate<i in the W,urt that could hear and determine them. ., · .. The question, then, is sll:ui\lY this: Can a court of common law, haVing jurisdle· lion of ionly'asubordfnitte, and·.1nferior interest, shut the doors of justice for twelve months or andsupelior claims of seamen for wa,g, ,e,' and P,reven,t,th,'em from seeking a emedy in the, only ,court that ('.ap. it?, I think not;, ·.· · it equally a deniai of the right of the coUrt,t:>f admirE!ltY the Jurisdiction conferred on It by the coustitutiooand laws of the United States. "NoW:, it,ls:very that/if this ship had been seized by process from a common,!,aw court of the, United States for a debt due from the owner, the possession .of the marsh:u :that process would have been superseded by prOCbSS fh)ln 'the admiralty upon a preferred nlllritime lien. This I understand to biHldinitted; and, if it be admitted, I do not see how the fact that this process waS from a common-law court of a state, and served by its own otli(' '1'8, IInUe.llDY difIel,' '.J}ce; the common-law court of a state has no luore right .W impede the lI-dijlfraity in the exercise, of its le@,'i.timate and exclusive 1>0"er8 than a comrilon-Iaw court of the Un.ited States, " "And thesherllf, who is the mere ministerial officer of the court of common law, can have no greater power or jurisdiction over 'the vessel than the court whose process ·he executes., Ele seizes what the court has a right to seize; he bas norigh.t ()f possession beYond It; and, if the interest over which 1;p.e court has jurisdiction is secohdary and subordinate to the interest over which the admiralty hai!l' exclush'e jmisdiction, his possession is secondary and subordinate, in like mann:er, and subject to the process on the superior and paramount claim. It is the process and the authority of the court to issue it that ruust determine who llllS the sup\lrior right. · · · In the case of 'l'he Flora, 1 Hagg. Adm. :otis, tlle vessel had betm seized by a sheriff upon ilrocess from the court of ·She was afterwards, and whUe ill possession of the sheriff. :ure<lted' updllproc.essfroU1 the admIralty 011 a prior maritime lien, and was sold by themal.'Shalwhilethesheritl' still held her under the common-law proCCSR. 'l'he ,by tile', p;1arshal was held to be valid by the king's bench. · ·.· I ber that a court which, by the constitution of the (l'arshal actMIUtider'll.' Of competent authority, (see note, p. 301;) and they refused. to interfere With the sui'plus Ivllich remained after payment of
the semhen's wages, which h:ld b£>en paid Into the registry of the admiralty, eyen in behalf of the creditor who had seized under their own process.· · · It wal'i conceded on all h3J1.,ds that the possession ot the sheriff was no obstacle to the arrest by the marshal. "But it seems, however, to be supposed that the circumstance that the (',om· mon-Iaw court was the conrtof a state, and not of the United States, distinguishes this case from that of 'rhe Flora, and is decisive in this controversy. And it is said that the Royal Saxon was in the possession of another sovereignty, and in the custody of its law, and that no process could be served upon her. issuing from the court of a different sovereignty, without infrInging upon the rights of the state, and bringing on unavoidably a conflict between the United States and the state. If by another and a different sovereignty it is meant that the power of the btate is sovereign in its sphere of action, as marked out by the constitution of the United States, and that no court or officer of the United States can seize or interfere with property in the cm;tody of an officer of a state court, where the property and all the right in it are subject to the control of the authorities of the state, nobody will dispute the llroposltlon; but if it is intended to Ilay that, in the administration of judicial power, the tribunals of the state and the Ullited States are to be regarded as the tribunals of tleparate and independent sovereignties, dealing with each other in this respect upon the plinciples which govern the comity 'of nations, I cannot assent to it. The constitution of the United States is as much a part of the law of Pennsylvania as its own constitution; and the laws passeQ by congress pursuant to the constitution are as obligatory, upon the courts of the as upon those of the United States; and they are eqltally bound to respect and uphold the' acts and process of the courts of the United States, when acting within the ,"cope of, their legitimate authority. · . · · .. '''I'be constitution and laws wbich establish the admiralty courts and regulate their jurisdiction are a part of the supreme law of the state; and that state conIc! not authorize its common-law courts to issue any pro()ess or its officers to p-xecute it whIch would impede or prevent the court from ,per. forming the duties imposed upon it. in the power it by the constitution and laws of the Dnited States. 'rhe states bave ,not,and cannot have, Unyjurisdiction in admiralty and maritime liens, to bring them !,Uto contlict with the courts of the United States. "The constitution and laws of the United States confer the en1;ire and maritime jurisdiction exprE'ssly upon the courts of the general goYernment, and, admiralty and maritime liens are tbprefore ov.tside of the line which marks the authority of a cominon·law court of a state, and excluded fro'm its jurisdiction; and if a common-law cwrt sells the vessel to which the lien has attached, upon condemnation, to pay the debt, or on account of its perlsh3.ble condition, it must sell subject to the maritime liens, and they will adhere to the vessel in the hands of the purchaser and of those claiming under him. · · · I cannot be persuaded that a court which, by the constitution utthe United States, has no jurisdiction on the 8ubject-matter-that is, the maritime lien---ean, directly or indirectly, delay the court which, by the constitution, has exclusive jurisdiction, from fulfilling its jUdicial duty, or the seamen from their remedy where alone they can obtain It."
It does not appear whether the seamen, after the final conclusion of the common-law suit, brought their libel in admiralty to assert their lien against the purchaser of the Royal Saxon; but as the common-law suit, begun in 1847, did not end until 1858, it must be presumed that they had in the long interval been scattered by the winds to the four quarters of the earth. ' It can hardly be pretended that the late Chief ,J"m'ltice Taney, wh.(), for maintaining the supremacy of state laws in a matter within the proper sphere of state authority in a memorable case, was the besta.bused judge that ever sat upon the bench, was capable of dispara ging the authority of a state court in the case in which he delivered the opinion from which the foregoing extracts were made;' The only
FEDERAL . REP0J:l,TER,
that case of Taylor v. Carryl, which was before the supl'etne 'Wurt, was not whether the arrest and sale of the ship by the comtttdfi'law court in a sUit'against the owner by acreditol' at large ordered at all, but si.Jnply whether the admiralty could inter, pose to subject the ship to a maritime lien during the pendency of the common-law suit. Five of the justices held that the admiralty could' riot interpose; four .of the justices dissenting from that ruling, aI),d holding that the admira.1ty c.ourt could not be thus delayed in the of its especial and exclusive powers. The practice of the king's: bench of England (a tribunal supposed bJ" la'\tYers who have not kept pace with the progress of legal science to be espeCially hostile to the admiralty jurisdiction) iEidifferent from that by the supreme court of the United States in Taylor v. Carryl. Not only in the case of The Flora, cited did it give to the admiralty, but it is the pracby court in like cases to .do .so. Nor are the other courts of longer influenced by the passionate mvectivesof Lord Coke against the admiralty. In the case of Harmer v. Bell, reported, ipthisoountry, in 22 En.g.Law & Eq. 62, we find a case, heard on apcouncil, si):nUar in principle to the one at bar. I quote from the' syllabus:
"A S,cotch steamer ran doWn an English vessel in the Humber. A suit was by the owners of the English vessel the oWner of, the steamer, in the court of ",eseion in Scotland, for dam:lge, and the steamer wall arrested under process Of that court. Afterwards, and these proceediIi8S. the steamer was sold by the Scotch court without notice to the purclUuierofthls unsatisfied claim against her. The proceedings in the court of session were still pending when the steamer, having .come within the jurisditltian of England, was again arrested under pt'Jeess of the high court of allmifllltyin' England, and an action for damages commenced in that court for of action as' was still pendhlg In Scotlanll. The owner of the steal1ler, .Who had purchased her, appear under protest In the admiralty :d court; pleaded-First, lis alibi pemlen8; and, secondly, that he was a purchaser ':eor value without notice. Held, first,. that the plea of lis alibi pendens was bad, as the suit In Scotland was In the first Instance In personam, the suit being . commenced by process against the persons of the owners of the' vessel, (the defendants,) and the arrest only collateral to secure the debt, ",hUe the in the admiralty court in England were, in the filSt instnncein rE'm, against the vessel, and therefore the two suits, being ill their natureditrermt, the pen.denc:r of one suit could not be pleaded In SUSP0Usion of tlleotherj secondly. that as by the cMllaw a maritime HE'D does Dot include orreqtl.ire possession, but, being 'the foundation of proceedings in rem, such HE'll trllvell:l with the thing into whosesoever possession it may come, and. when (lamed .lnto effect by. a proceeding in rem, relates back to the period when itflrstaftached, the steamer was lillble for the damages commItted by her, though In the hands of a purchaser, witll0ut notice of the. damage, or of the proceedings illstituted against her."
I think it is plain from what has been said that a maritime lien cannot be divested by any proceeding in a civil action in a commonlaw court; that su(.'h COll:rt cannot exercise jurisdiction over the lien either. directly or indirectly; and that a state of this Union cannot under the ponstitution confer jurisdiction to divest this lien, the lien the moment of the contract or tort in which it originates, and traveling with the ship wherever. it may go, into whosesoever come, by whatever right or accident. Nor can it possession
be adjudicated in the United States by any other court than those upon which, by the constitution and laws of the United States, the exclusive jurisdiction over it is conferred. The state of Alabama once passed a law by which she aimed to confer on certain state courts, as to certain maritime contracts, a jurisdiction over ships precisely the same as that possessed by the United States courts of ad· miralty; but the law became a nullity under the decision of the supreme court of the United States in the case of The Belfast, 7 Wall. 624, in which it was held that"In all cases "here a maritime lien arises, the original jurisdiction to enforce it by a proceeding in rem is exclusive in the district courts of the United States, as provided by the ninth section of the judiciary act of 1789. State legislatures have no authority to create Dlfuitime liens; nor can they confer juris<Uction upon a state court to enforce ::meh a lien by a suit or proceeding In rem as practiced in admIralty courts. The statute of 7th of October, 1864, of the state of Alabama, is. therefore unconstItutional and void,"
The admiralty jurisdiction under the law of nations is criminal as weHas civil. The states in ceding, by the constitution, to the judicial power of the United States the cognizance of "all cases of ad· miralty and maritime jurisdiction," retained no part· of the jurisdiction, either civil or criminal; and, when congress created certain courts as admiralty courts, the admiralty jurisdiction passed exhaustively to them, by virtue of the constitution, and it was unnecessary for congress to enact in express words, as it did, that this juris· diction in civil causes should be exclusive. The jurisdiction in I em, belonging to admiralty courts,-that is to say, the power to deal with ships by name as sentient beings, irrespectively of ownership or other condition or circumstance,-belongs exclusively and pe· culiarly to the admiralty, and cannot be conferred, either for civil or criminal purposes, by state legislation, upon the common·law courts of a state, so as to operate in derogation or exclusion of the power of the admiralty to enforce maritime liens in due course of ad· . miralty procedure. In evasion of these settled principle::; of admh'alty law, it avails nothing to contend that the police laws of a state are superior to them. Analogous in this respect to the law of Virginia providing for the seizure in rem and confiscation of vessels engaged in violating her oyster laws are the penal laws of congress enacted for the suppression of the slave trade and the unlawful catching of Africans on the Guinea coast. It was held by the supreme court that the sale of property forfeited under laws against the slave trade by proceedings in one of the circuit courts of the United States (which are com· mon·law courts) did not affect the maritime liens of seamen and material men upon the property forfeited. In the case of The St. J ago de Cuba, 9 Wheat. 409, it was held that"The claims of seamen for wages, and of material mcnEor supplies, where the parties were innocent of all knowledge of, or participation in, the illegal Yoyage, are preferred to the claim of forfeiture on the part of 1be governlnent."
The court says in its opinion in that case:
"The precedence of forfeiture has never been carried further than to overreach common-law contracts ntered into by the owner; and it would be un-
.''Forfeiture not ride over the Whether' they. be. called 'liens' or i1tnthe case and salvage, it is unquestionable that forfeftnrbR wQUldJbe and we see no groUild on which to preclude any other 'marit1meo'.claim really ,and honestly acquired. We concur in the opinion of the.coJ1,fli below 1;Jlat falr cWms of· and subsequent material men are overL'e.aehed forieij;ure." .
While thisisso,yet it isundoubteilly true that the rights of seamen and aU othe:nii on board of an ofIending vessel at the time of her arrest, and also the rights of the owner of the. vessel, whether he be innocent of her 'offense 01' not, may be confiscated in due course of proceeding by the common-law courts of the states, as well as of the '0:. Ei·Y. The Malek Adhel, 2 How. 210. . Qt VOOl;heesv. 13ank:, 10 Pet..449; v. Zimmerman, 14.Wall·.1l3; McNitt v. Turner, 16 Wall. 365; McCready v. Vir· ginia, 94 U. 13.391; and Boggs v. Com., 76 Va. 989,"-are not in point. '11larity of the proceeding in the They wouJ,dbe b1 point if . the reb cOnunOl\-J1!,wcourt only was in question. Where a court of common law"hQ.$g :replete jurisdiction of a, has passed final decree or ,the regularity,,,of its procet¥lings cannot be examined collaterallY',:But. j:urisdiction is confined within certain limits of the Unite.;J. States,·their jurisdiction may .sofar as they transcend the limits of their constit:ujionlJ.lpowers. . . ' None WUl4eny the Competency of the state of Virginia to pa.ss laws of forfeiture and conftsGationeffectual for the. important purpose her "Qeds from piratical depredartion. Such laws, of as· far .lil.Stheycan be operative, should be uphel4 and respected by the by the cpurts. The question here. is not upon the policy ofsllch,! :u,pon the competencY,of the state to enact them, when enMted,. they can be made to em-. power to exercise adIJ,l,iraJ.t.y jurisdiction in prejudice of maritime liens; the states having', as the supreme court U. S. v. Bevans, ,3 Wheat. 336, and in of the Ullited States .Tones v.League, 18 How.. 76, "parte<l:with the power so to legislate jurisdiction or laws of the :United as to States.:' Having parted with that power, the. state of Virginia cannot exercise it to the andd,estruction of maritime liens resting upon vefi!S.els seized AAd confispated under her laws for the prowction of oyster bede!, where the seaInen, material men, and others holding these liens are innocent ofplitrticipation in the acts for which tb.e vessels are confiscated. It isurge(i by the general of Virginia that the oyster fundum of the state, if, lle]lSarisinganterior to confiscation were given precedence over forfeiture, would be destroyed, as. vessels would go upon voyages of trespass "plaRtered allover with. liens." But maritime liens are few, of definite cha,ra.cter, and <lifficuIt to counterfeit. To be valid, they must be of recent origin; staleness destroys them. The court would stultify itself to admit the possibility of such abuRes as this learned oi'ficerapprehends. Besides, it must be remembered ;that coustitutionalrights cannot be brushed away by mere suspicions.offt·aud. The admiralty court will always lean
NATIONAL CASH REGISTER CO. V. AMERICAN CASH REGISTER CO.
the state in adjudicating these liens, and will rigidly scrutinize'aUsllch claims. '. . . I cOIne, therefore, to the examination of the claims of the libel· ants and petitioners in the three cases at bar. In the case of the schooner Elexena there are two claims of material men. That of S. F. Hastings for $36.63, for sails and repairs of sails, etc., is stale as to $23.63; only $13 is therefore allowed. That of Crockett & Connorton for $62.36, for supplies furnished within six months before the seizure of the vessel by the state of Virginia, is allowed. Decree will be entered for these sums. As to the claims of seamen filed in this case, amounting to $126.03, it appears from the imperfect papers presented in their behalf that they were on board of the Elexena at the time of her capture in delicto, presumably participating with the vessel in her vidlations of the laws of the state. These claims are therefore disallowed. As to the case of the schooner Alice J. Venable. The claim of the libelant, J.T. Gibbons, is for sails and repairs of sails, furnished within' six months before the seizure of the' vessel, amounting to $68.59, Which is allowed That of Prendergast & SOllS, for sails and other Inaterials furnished within six months before the seizure of the vessel, amounting to $346.35, is allowed. As to the claims of seamen preferred in this case, am:ounting to $100.81, it is almost a necessary presumption, from the papers evidencing the claims, that the seamen were on board the offending ves$el at the time of her seizure, and they a:re therefore disallowed. In the case of the schooner Samuel T. White, the claim of the libelant for sails and tackle, amounting to $168, furnished within six months before seizure, is all(f\ved. 'fhat of Ernest Parsons, amounting to $208.70, is disallowed in part and allowed in part. Items to the amount of $60.70 are disallowed as stale. Items to the amount of $13, for sails furnished after the seizure of the vessel, are disallowed, as not within the cognizance of the court. Of this claim the sum of $135 is allowed. Decree will be entered accordingly.
NATIONAT, CASH REGISTEU CO. et aI. v. Al\IERICAN CASH REGISTER CO.
(Circuit Court of Appeals, Third Circuit. December 23, 1892.)
CIRCUIT COURT OF ApPEALS-PATENT CASES-DECISIONS
The rule which requires a circuit court to folloW the deCision of another circuit court in relation to the same patent, When the question and the evidence are the same, does not extend to the circuit court of appeals; and that conrt will exercise its independent judgment, giving attentive consideration, however, to the judgments of the circuit courts in other circuits.
PATENTS FOR INVENTIONS-COMBINATIONS.
In order that a combination of old elements may be patentable, it is not neCeSS<'1lj' that all the constituents shall so enter into the combination that each changes the mode of action of every other, and that each not only performs its own part, but is also in some way directiy concerned in the per-